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NOTES
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS IN THE WAKE OF OLIPHANT
Steven M. Johnson*
In their effort to procure greater autonomy and self-determina-
tion, American Indian tribes in recent years have attempted to ex-
ercise a greater degree of legal authority over non-Indians within
reservation boundaries.1 In 1978 the United States Supreme
Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe2 refused to recog-
nize well-established principles of inherent Indian sovereignty3
* First Place Winner, 1979 Indian Law Writing Competition. B.A. 1970, Univers-
ity of Montana; M.A. 1974, University of Colorado; J.D. expected 1980, University of
Montana.
1. See Note, Indian Law-Indian Tribes Have No Inherent Authority to Exercise
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians Violating Tribal Criminal Laws Within Reserva-
tion Boundaries, 28 CATHOLIC L. REV. 663, 663 n.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note].
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3. The leading case dealing with tribal sovereignty is Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832). That decision developed an essentially tripartite analysis defining the
current extent of tribal sovereignty: (1) Indian tribes originally possessed the inherent
sovereignty of any independent nation; (2) the sovereignty of the Indian nations was
necessarily lessened after conquest and must yield to conflicting plenary federal authority;
and (3) Indian tribes now possess the same measure of internal sovereignty they possessed
before conquest except for those powers expressly withdrawn by a congressional treaty or
statute, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.), supra, at 559-61. See Note, Tribal Courts Lack Jurisdiction
Over Non-Indian Offenders, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 537, 556-57; F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 122-23 (1942) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
The Court in Oliphant generally accepted this tripartite analysis, finding that tribes
retained an inherent "quasi-sovereignty" in some areas, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), but
modified the traditional analysis to exclude sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction. Essen-
tially, the Court held that the sovereign power of Indian tribes is extinguished not only
when Congress has revoked it by express legislative acts but when the exercise of
sovereign power is inconsistent with the status of the tribe. Id. at 208. The evolution of
the concept of inherent Indian sovereignty in the case law is long and complex. It has
been thoroughly discussed in the material cited below and need not be reconsidered here.
See TASK FoRca REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION (American Indian
Policy Review Comm'n Comm. Print 1976), at 89093; Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Country in Arizona, I ARiz. L. REv. 62, 63-65 (1959); Vollmann, Criminal
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22
KAN. L. REv. 387, 389-97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vollman]; Comment, Tribal Sover-
eignty Sustained: Oliphant v. Schite and Indian Court Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 IowA L.
Rav. 230, 232-35 (1977); Comment, Oliphant v. Schie: Recognition of Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 531, 631-33; Recent Developments,
Indian Law-Sovereignty and Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Offenders, 52 WASH.
L. REv. 989, 991-95 (1977); Note, supra note 1, at 666-76; 24 S.D. L. REv. 217, 218-27
(1979).
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and held that Indian courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute non-
Indians for crimes on the reservation.'
Indian criminal jurisdiction involves an allocation of authority
among federal, state, and tribal courts.' Tribal jurisdictional
powers are derived from the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes
and, before the Oliphant decision, were considered to be limited
only to the extent that tribal authority had been taken away by
treaty or federal statute. 6 The effect of the Oliphant decision was
to remove the tribe from the tri-sovereign jurisdictional scheme
whenever a non-Indian criminal defendant is involved, leaving
only the state and the federal government as possible prosecuting
entities.
The practical law enforcement problems that result from deny-
ing the tribe the power to enforce its laws against non-Indians
committing offenses on the reservation are to a large degree self-
evident. As the American Indian Policy Review Commission has
pointed out, the only workable law enforcement authority present
in many areas of Indian country is that of the tribe.7 The
Oliphant decision, therefore, may well render law and order less
readily attainable in Indian country, particularly in the area of
minoir offenses of the sort involved in Oliphant.' Whereas a non-
Indi~a offender who commits a major crime against the person
or property of an Indian on the reservation incurs the possibility
of being prosecuted in federal court under the General Crimes
Act, 9 relatively minor infractions of state and tribal law, such as
traffic offenses, trespasses, even petty thefts and simple assault,
will probably never rouse the attention of a federal prosecutor
nor reach an overburdened federal court system.
The enforcement hiatus created by Oliphant could well become
especially aggravating, humiliating, and frustrating for the tribes
in the case of so-called "victimless" offenses, such as reckless
4. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
5. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., "Criminal
Jurisdiction," MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW D-1 et seq. (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW].
6. COHEN, supra note 3, at 122.
7. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, I FINAL REPORT 5 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FINAL REPORT].
8. The Oliphant case arose out of the arrest of two non-Indians by tribal peace of-
ficers on the Port Madison Reservation of the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Mark D.
Oliphant was charged with assaulting a tribal officer and with resisting arrest. Daniel B.
Belgrade was accused of reckless driving by tribal authorities. 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
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driving, speeding and other traffic crimes, gambling offenses, dis-
turbing the peace, or disorderly conduct offenses, which occur
with some frequency everywhere. Presumably the tribes are not
even empowered to enforce lowly parking meter fines against
non-Indian offenders in tribal courts. Taken individually these
may seem innocuous; collectively, such minor crimes, if they are
not punished effectively, are irksome. One reaction may be anger
of the tribe toward non-Indians on the reservation, and there may
be disrespect or disdain by some non-Indians toward the tribal
authorities. In a newspaper interview published immediately after
the Supreme Court handed down the Oliphant decision, a can-
didate for the position of Crow tribal chairman stated that Crow
tribal members were "really disturbed" about the Court's hold-
ing and predicted some tribal members might "take the law into
their own hands." 1 Certainly, if effective alternatives to tribal
enforcement are not found, tension between tribes and surround-
ing non-Indian populations will grow. The dignity of tribal gov-
ernment will suffer in the eyes of Indians and non-Indians alike,
and an increase in lawless behavior could ensue.
The Oliphant decision comes at a time when non-Indian crime
on the reservations is prevalent, a fact the Supreme Court took
notice of in Oliphant, while deeming it to be a problem calling
for congressional and not judicial resolution." Many tribes are
plagued by vandalism, illegal dumping of trash, malicious mis-
chief, traffic offenses, and other minor violations of state and
tribal law.12 These are offenses that could be easily dealt with by
well-trained Indian police and tribal courts. Even before
Oliphant, many minor offenses by non-Indians on the reservation
went unpunished and thus unregulated largely because of the lack
of tribal resources to suppress and prosecute non-Indian crime on
any significant scale.1 3 To prohibit tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians at a time when tribes are evolving or, indeed,
have developed effective police and judicial systems is regrettable.
The decision will perpetuate an enforcement vacuum that has tra-
ditionally plagued the tribes.
10. Hardin Herald, Mar. 9, 1978, at 1, reprinted in U.S. Cong., Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, Hearing on S. 2502, Tribal-State Compact Act of 1978, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S. 2502].
11. 435 U.S. 191, 212 n.18 (1978).
12. 4 NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, JUSTICE AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN].
13. See Voilman, supra note 3.
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This note will first briefly outline the rules governing state and
federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Second, since,
after Oliphant, only the state and the federal government remain
as potential prosecuting entities, this note will examine the suit-
ability of each to fill the enforcement vacuum that has resulted
from removal of the tribe from the tripartite of criminal jurisdic-
tion in Indian country where a non-Indian defendant is involved.
Third, the note will discuss potential solutions to the juris-
dictfonal and enforcement problems that have surfaced as a result
of the Oliphant decision.
The Pattern of State and Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
in Indian Country
A state's claim to criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is
premised fundamentally on the theory that it has sovereignty over
all citizens, inhabitants, and lands within its borders. 14 State
powers are, however, limited by the superior power of the federal
government "to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes and to
exercise its guardianship responsibilities over its Indian wards." II
The result is that states have no jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians or by In-
dians against non-Indians unless expressly granted by Congress.I6
Under Public Law 83-280, for example, some states have been ac-
corded jurisdiction over crimes by or against Indians in Indian
country. 7 There is, however, one important judicially created ex-
14. MANUAL OF INDAN LAW, supra note 5, at D-1.
15. Id.
16. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946). The general rule that federal
authority to regulate affairs with Indian tribes is preemptive, leaving no room for the
states to exercise jurisdiction over Indians or their property within Indian country except
as specifically authorized by Congress, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in recent years. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Fisher v. District Ct.,
424 U.S. 382 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly
v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
17. Now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and other scattered sec-
tions in 18 and 28 U.S.C., as amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1978). In Indian country
affected by Public Law 83-280, the allocation of federal and state jurisdiction differs
from that in non-Public Law 83-280 states. Public Law 83-280 confers on six "man-
datory" states, and on several "optional" states, criminal jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted by or against Indians in Indian country, as follows: "to the same extent that such
state has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the state, and the criminal
laws of such states shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the state."
The General Crimes Act is not applicable in Public Law 83-280 jurisdictions. 18
[Vol. 7
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ception to the rule that states only possess such criminal jurisdic-
tion as expressly conferred by federal statute. Under the so-called
McBratney rule developed by the United States Supreme Court,
states are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over offenses commit-
ted by non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country, unless
Congress has specifically provided for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. 18
The general criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts in Indian
country is founded upon the General Crimes Act 9 and the Major
Crimes Act. 20 Under these statutes and the established case law
the respective criminal jurisdiction of federal, state, and tribal
courts depends upon whether the person charged or the victim of
the crime is an Indian and upon whether the offense was commit-
ted in Indian country. Case law has developed a definition of
"Indian" for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 21 "Indian
country" is statutorily defined as (1) all land within an Indian
reservation (including public rights-of-way and patents), (2) de-
pendent Indian communities (whether or not within reservation
boundaries), and (3) all Indian allotments to which Indian title
has not been extinguished (whether or not located within reserva-
tion boundaries). 22 The General Crimes Act has been held to ex-
tend federal criminal laws applicable in federal enclaves, 23 in-
cluding the Assimilative Crimes Act, 24 to Indian country. Despite
the broad language of the statute, the General Crimes Act does
not apply to crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970) (mandatory states); 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970) (optional states).
Therefore, except for crimes that are peculiarly federal in nature, Public Law 83-280
states may exercise jurisdiction in Indian country to the exclusion of federal authorities
over offenses committed by Indians against either Indians or non-Indians, and over of-
fenses by non-Indians against Indians. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PRO-
GRAM, INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 107 et seq. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as INDIAN JURISDICTION].
18. See New York v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S.
240 (1896); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 377 (1886); Utah v. N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116
U.S. 28 (1885); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). These cases created an
exception to the doctrine of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), that Indian
lands were extraterritorial to the states in which they were located. See INDIAN JURISDIC-
TION, supra note 17, at 87.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
21. See MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at D-1 n.3.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
23. In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891).
24. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 713 (1946).
1979]
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Indians.2" Neither does it extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, "6 nor
does it apply to any Indian who has been punished by tribal law
for an offense committed in Indian country. 7 The Assimilative
Crirmes Act28 applies state law in federal court to define criminal
conduct where federal law does not govern in the activity. In ef-
fect, the Act adopts state law as federal law to fill gaps in the
federal criminal code.2 9
The Major Crimes Act makes fourteen specific crimes commit-
ted by one Indian against either another Indian or a non-Indian
punishable in federal court.30
Present Federal Suitability to Prosecute Minor
Non-Indian Crime on the Reservation
Asked his opinion of the effect of Oliphant on law enforce-
merit on the reservations immediately after the Supreme Court
handed down that decision, the United States Attorney in Butte,
Montana stated: " 'It would be a sort of vacuum, that's for sure.
It could dramatically change some of the Indian jurisdictional
rights that have gone into effect since 1935.'I"3
As to the role of the United States Attorney and other federal
law enforcement officials in filling that void, the Montana at-
torney reportedly said that the United States government
"doesn't have the staff to be policemen" when it comes to en-
forcing all laws on reservations. He said neither the F.B.I. nor
his office could be expected to keep up with the caseload if all
non-Indian persons charged with minor crimes on Indian reser-
vations were to be referred to the federal level for prosecu-
tion.2
The article then continued:
25. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978).
215. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
27. Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. LaPlant,
156 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1957).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. 1976).
29. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 503, 533-34 (1976).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
31. Billings Gazette, Mar. 7, 1978, at 8A, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2502, supra
note 11, at 81.
32. Id.
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The U.S. Justice Department currently investigates all felony
charges-whether against Indian or non-Indian-committed
on Indian reservations.
The big question now is, who will assume jurisdiction over
non-Indians charged with misdemeanor crimes on the reserva-
tion-federal or state and county courts? Or will a separate
justice system for non-Indians be set up on the reservations? 33
The article in general and the comments of the federal prosecu-
tor in particular indicate the present inadequacy of the federal
system of criminal enforcement and prosecution to fil the gap
created by Oliphant. Tribes have long complained of the reluc-
tance of federal authorities to prosecute non-Indians for offenses
committed on the reservation. This reluctance is based partly on
attitude and partly on inadequate resources and logistics. The
United States Attorney's office is often located in major cities
remote from Indian communities. There matters affecting the
tribes on a day-to-day basis are not publicized and do not appear
to be matters of great weight.34 Some offices are responsible for
several Indian reservations within the judicial districts. 35 Tribes
have complained that the federal prosecutors are often un-
cooperative, if not openly hostile, when requested to prosecute
minor criminal cases arising on the reservation. 6 In declining to
investigate and prosecute a case rigorously, the United States At-
torney may be influenced by his own view of what constitutes
"moral, acceptable or excusable behavior," and his view may not
correspond with Indian tradition or tribal policy. 3
Jurisdictional questions would not seem to be a barrier to
federal prosecution of non-Indian violators of federal or state of-
fenses. When such violations occur on the reservation, the Gen-
eral Crimes Act gives federal court jurisdiction over federally
defined offenses, and the application of the Assimilative Crimes
Act through the General Crimes Act allows federal courts to bor-
row state criminal law in order to define federal criminal of-
fenses.38
The inadequacy of the federal criminal system as it now exists
to replace local tribal police and tribal courts in protecting tribal
33. Id.
34. 5 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 12, at 33.
35. Id.
36. 1 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 12, at 54.
37. 5 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 12, at 38.
38. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
1979]
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interests against minor, annoying non-Indian criminal conduct
was aptly summarized in the brief of the Suquamish Tribe to the
United States Supreme Court in the Oliphant case:
Federal law is not designed to cover the range of conduct nor-
mally regulated by local governments.... Federal authorities
axe reluctant to institute federal proceedings against non-
Indians for minor offenses in courts in which the dockets are
already overcrowded, where litigation will involve burdensome
travel for witnesses and investigative personnel, and where the
case will most probably result in a small fine or perhaps a
suspended sentence." 9
State Jurisdiction as a Suitable Alternative to Tribal Jurisdiction
A reluctance to prosecute non-Indians vigorously for minor of-
fenses committed on the reservation is characteristic of state as
well as of federal prosecutors. Prosecutors in counties adjoining
Indian reservations are frequently not anxious to prosecute
because limitations on state process within Indian country may
frustrate attempts to obtain witnesses.1° In addition, the jurisdic-
tional division between federal, state, and tribal governments is
less than clear"' and the peace and dignity of the government af-
fected is not that of the state but that of the Indian tribe."
In individual cases, the reluctance of the state to prosecute
non-Indians for victimless offenses committed on the reservation
is grounded in practical considerations of procedural mechanics
and political expediency as well as in a basic uncertainty regard-
ing substantive jurisdiction. However, there can be no doubt that
in general the state has a legitimate interest in effective law en-
forcement on the reservation. Certainly it is in the state's interest
that public highways traversing the reservation are adequately
patrolled and do not become unregulated racetracks. State
citizens, both Indian and non-Indian, make frequent use of these
highways. In the western states, crossing a reservation is often
unavoidable unless one is willing to take long and time-con-
suming detours on secondary roads. Although a state's interest in
39. Brief for Respondent at 65, Oliphant v. Suquamnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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safe highways is indisputable, jurisdictional uncertainties hamper
effective enforcement of highway safety laws. Such public rights-
of-way as highways traversing reservations are defined by Section
1151 of Title 18 of the United States Code as part of Indian coun-
try. Hence, offenses committed on highways by tribal members
are subject to federal and tribal jurisdiction under the General
Crimes Act.43 It has been specifically held that the state may not
prosecute tribal members for highway violations occurring on a
public highway within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reser-
vation on the grounds that the General Crimes Act preempts state
jurisdiction when an Indian defendant is involved. 4
As a practical result, state highway patrolmen are often reluc-
tant to stop speeding or reckless drivers on reservation highways
because the state lacks jurisdiction if the driver is an Indian. As
will be discussed more fully later,'4 there is even uncertainty re-
garding the extent to which the McBratney rule grants states
jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians for state-defined "victim-
less" offenses, such as highway violations, occurring in Indian
country. Since Oliphant, tribal police officers may well be reluc-
tant to patrol public highways crossing the reservation in a vig-
orous manner for fear that the traffic violator stopped could be a
non-Indian whom the tribe could not punish.
Generally, the state has an obvious interest in preventing the
jurisdictional and enforcement vacuum from rendering the reser-
vations havens for non-Indian crime. Given the tribe's lack of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the remoteness of federal
law enforcement and prosecuting personnel, and the uncertainties
surrounding state jurisdiction, non-Indians-by simply crossing
into a reservation-could conceivably evade criminal prosecution
and conviction for violation of state laws governing such matters
as drug possession and sale, alcohol regulation, or gambling.
Although states are presently reluctant to prosecute non-
Indians for violations of state law that occur on the reservation,
they certainly have a legitimate interest in doing so insofar as cur-
rent jurisdictional uncertainties can be resolved in favor of state
jurisdiction to punish non-Indian victimless offenses occurring on
the reservation.
43. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
44. In re Denetclaw, 83 Ariz. 299, 320 P.2d 697 (1958).
45. See text accompanying notes 58-78 infra.
19791
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Potential Solutions to Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems
1. Increased Federal Presence in Indian Country
Even before Oliphant increased the enforcement problems on
reservations, recommendations were being made to improve the
effectiveness of the federal criminal justice system in combatting
crime on the reservation. In its Final Report the American Indian
Policy Review Commission recommended that the Department of
Justice issue regulations directing United States Attorneys to ac-
cept criminal referrals from qualified tribal and BIA police and
investigators. 1 Interestingly, a Department of Justice report had
itself ascertained that United States Attorneys had declined to
prosecute 75 percent of the Indian cases presented to them.41
While this figure may not vary substantially from the rate of
decline in cases involving non-Indian matters, it nevertheless in-
dicates that a larger number of Indian criminal cases go un-
prosecuted. This is especially true because the federal government
is often the only available prosecuting entity on the reservation.
In non-Indian matters, by contrast, state prosecutors may act
where federal authorities have declined to prosecute."
Following Oliphant, the concern for more effective federal
prosecution of on-reservation crime has mounted. Reacting to the
Court's holding in that case, one commentator has stated: "Non-
Indian crime on the reservation is growing and the burden of the
problem now falls squarely upon the U.S. Attorneys' offices. Ser-
ious adjustments in both the capacity and philosophy of these of-
fices will be necessary if the reservations are to be truly secure
algainst all crime."41 9 In a letter to former United States Attorney
General Griffin Bell, the United States Civil Rights Commission
expressed its concern over the delivery and quality of law enforce-
ment services on and near reservations in the wake of the
Oliphant decision. Referring to the criticism which the American
Indian Policy Review Commission and the National American
Court Judges Association had leveled against the role of the FBI
in investigation, and the role of the United States Attorneys in
46. Recommendation No. 26, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
47. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Task Force on Indian Matters 41 (1975), cited
in Note, supra note 1, at 686-87 n.135.
43. See NATIONAL AMERicAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES Ass'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE
FUTURE 33-35 (D. Getches ed. 1978).
49. Keys, Some Early Comments on the Meaning of Oliphant, 5 INDIAN L. RirR.
M-24, M-25 (1978).
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prosecution of reservation crime, the Commission requested the
Justice Department to make known its views on the efficacy of
the existing program and on any plans for changes in the area."
The National American Indian Court Judges Association has
proposed several ways of increasing the effectiveness of federal
prosecution and investigation of reservation crime. It has recom-
mended the appointment of one or more assistant United States
Attorneys in each office to deal with Indian matters.5' An assis-
tant prosecutor who devoted a substantial amount of his or her
time to Indian problems would not only develop expertise in In-
dian law, but, it is hoped, would also develop a sensitivity toward
the tribal point of view. The Indian Court Judges Association
also advocates placing federal investigating personnel directly on
the reservation. 2 At present, several days often elapse between
the commission of a crime on the reservation and the arrival of
an FBI or BIA investigator who must travel to the reservation
from some distance. In the intervening time tribal police may
have difficulty in preserving valuable evidence that, if in-
vestigated immediately by the appropriate federal officials could
lead to a conviction.
The BIA and FBI currently almost exclusively investigate fel-
onies that occur on the reservation. .Given the enforcement hiatus
left by Oliphant, an effective federally approved procedure for
the investigation of misdemeanors committed by non-Indians on
the reservation is clearly called for. The recommendation of the
American Indian Policy Review Commission that the Department
of Justice issue regulations mandating United States Attorneys to
accept criminal referrals from specially trained tribal police is cer-
tainly one feasible solution.53
Another approach would be to systematically federalize all tri-
bal police after appropriate training in investigative procedures."'
Such an approach would have the advantage of directly involving
50. Letter from U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n to U.S. Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell, Mar. 14,
1978, reprinted in 5 INDIAN L. RPTR. M-26 (1978).
51. 5 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 12, at 49-50.
52. Id.
53. See Recommendation No. 26, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, and text accompany-
ing note 46.
54. Such an approach was suggested by Arlen Whiteman, a candidate for the office
of Crow tribal chairman, as a solution to the enforcement problems created by Oliphant.
He made the recommendation in a Mar. 9, 1978, interview published in the Hardin
Herald. Hardin Herald, Mar. 9, 1978, at 8, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2502, supra note
11, at 81.
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tribal members in the protection of tribal interests. The same
police responsible for enforcing tribal law against tribal members
would be actively engaged in enforcing federal law and state law
adopted as federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act
uniformly against Indian and non-Indian offenders. It might also
be possible, under such an approach, for federalized tribal police
to enforce and for federal courts to adopt tribal law as federal
law under the Assimilative Crimes Act. The federal courts have
consistently used state substantive law when applying the
Assimilative Crimes Act to Indian country. The statutory
language is, however, "State, Territory, Possession, or District in
which such place [i.e., the federal enclave] is situated, by the laws
thereof in force at the time of such act or omission . . . . "" It
has been suggested that this wording leaves open the question as
to whether tribal law could be considered the local law of the
jurisdiction in the Oliphant-type situation.16
The Judges Association has also recommended that grand jur-
ies be impanelled on the specific reservation where a major crime
occurs and that the federal trials of cases arising from crimes
committed on the reservation be held on the reservation itself,
rather than in the far distant areas where federal courts sit." An
increased federal presence on the reservations can be an adequate
solution to the enforcement vacuum left by Oliphant if pro-
cedures are developed to investigate efficiently and vigorously
and then prosecute non-Indian misdemeanors. Federalization of
tribal police would allow direct tribal participation and ensure
that those who care most about the peace and tranquility of the
reservation would be primarily responsible for law enforcement
there. Tribal policy as to what constitutes excusable behavior and
what criminal activity most warrants prosecution would
presumably be reflected in the judgment of the tribal police in ex-
ercising that discretion any peace officer must exercise in making
arrests and in otherwise suppressing criminal activity. Tribal
policy could be effectuated to a greater degree if federal courts
should one day hold that tribal law qualifies as the local law to be
applied under the Assimilative Crimes Act.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. 1976).
56. Note, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: A Jurisdictional Quagmire, 24 S.D.
L. REv. 217, 236 (1979).
57. 5 JUSICn AND THE AMEMCAN INDIAN, supra note 12, at 49-50.
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2. Expanded State Jurisdiction of Non-Indian "Victimless"
Offenses in Indian Country Under the McBratney Rule
In view of the state's clear interest in effective law enforcement
in Indian country, 8 increased state assertion of jurisdiction over
non-Indian victimless and consensual offenses occurring in In-
dian country is one practical response to fill the jurisdictional and
enforcement vacuum left by the Oliphant decision. This potential
solution will necessarily entail judicial construction to the extent
of the McBratney rule, 9 which allows state criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians committing crimes against other non-Indians in
Indian country. There is also some limited precedent for regard-
ing McBratney as authority for state assumption of jurisdiction
over victimless offenses (as defined by state law) committed by
non-Indians on Indian reservations.
In State ex rel. Nepstad v. Danielson,6" the Montana Supreme
Court upheld the state prosecution and conviction of a non-
Indian for violation of a state fish and game statute while on an
Indian reservation. In so doing, the court found that Section 1165
of Title 18 of the United States Code, making unlawful the entry
onto Indian land for the purpose of hunting, fishing, or trapping,
did not preempt the application of state law on the reservation.
In the court's view, the federal statute dealt primarily with tres-
pass and not with fish and game regulation. After deciding there
was no federal preemption of the field, the court, assuming that
the McBratney principle applied, summarily upheld the non-
Indian defendant's conviction. An earlier case upholding state
jurisdiction of state fish and game offenses coniihitted by a non-
Indian in Indian country is Exparte Crosby,61 a 1915 decision by
the Nevada Supreme Court. In an early Washington state case, a
non-Indian charged with the arguably victimless offense of manu-
facturing liquor on an Indian reservation was held to be properly
within the state court's jurisdiction. 62 An early Minnesota case
58. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
59. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
60. 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967).
61. 38 Nev. 389, 149 P. 989 (1915). In 1971 the Solicitor of the Interior, relying on
Danielson and on Crosby, as well as on the opinions of the attorneys general of Nevada,
New Mexico, and Oregon, stated that a state had both the power and the right to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians alleged to have violated state game laws on an Indian reser-
vation. 78 I.D. 101, 104.
62. State v. Lindsey, 133 Wash. 140, 233 P. 327 (1925).
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upheld state jurisdiction over a non-Indian woman charged with
the state-defined consensual offense of adultery; the charge
against the other participant, an Indian man, was dismissed as be-
ing beyond state court jurisdiction.63 While not examining the
issue in great detail, more recent decisions have upheld state
jurisdiction over possessory drug offenses"' and traffic offenses 61
conunitted by non-Indians on Indian reservations.
The United States Supreme Court has never held that the
McBratney rule extends to victimless and consensual offenses,
and much of the limited precedent stems from turn of the century
state appellate courts. Nevertheless, a cogent argument can be
made that the historical practice has been to regard McBratney as
authority for state jurisdiction over victimless offenses committed
by non-Indians on the reservation. If an adequate federal
response to solve the enforcement problems posed by Oliphant is
not forthcoming, state courts are more likely to so construe
McBratney, especially when both tribal and state law enforce-
ment agencies are desirous of increased state jurisdiction over vic-
timless crimes on reservations.
Expressly relying on the above cited cases and construing
McBratney as applying to victimless offenses, the Office of Legal
Counsel of the United States Department of Justice prepared a
memorandum in which it contends that the states-and not the
federal government-have exclusive jurisdiction over most traffic
offenses and other crimes committed on Indian reservations by
non-Indians when there is no identifiable victim. 6" The memor-
andumn was prepared and filed in the United States District Court
for New Mexico in support of the Justice Department's motion
for summary judgment in a case styled Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Bell.67 In this case the tribe sought to require the United States
to enforce the New Mexico state traffic codes against non-Indians
operating vehicles on the reservation. This suit appears to have
been initiated in response to Oliphant. Federal courts would
arguably be empowered to enforce state traffic laws by adopting
them as federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act.
63. State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 552 (1893).
64. State v. Jones, 92 Nev. 116, 546 P.2d 235 (1976) (possession of marijuana).
65. State v. Warner, 71 N.M. 418, 379 P.2d 66 (1963).
66. Memorandum for Benjamin R. Civiletti, Deputy Attorney General, Jurisdiction
Over "Victimless" Crimes Committed by Non-Indians on Indian Reservations, reprinted
in 6 INDIAN L. RPTR. K-15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memo].
67. No. 78-926C (D.N.M., filed Dec. 14, 1978).
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The memorandum reasons that federal jurisdiction over non-
Indian victimless offenses is not invoked by a mere generalized in-
terest in peace and tranquility on the reservation.68 According to
the Justice Department, the McBratney case itself, which involved
the murder of one non-Indian by another non-Indian on a reser-
vation, "belies that view since . . . a murder on the reserva-
tion-a much more significant breach of the peace than simple
vagrancy, drug possession, speeding, or public drunkenness"-
provided no basis for an assertion of federal jurisdiction. 69
Federal jurisdiction over non-Indian victimless offenses could only
be invoked if there is a "concrete and particularized threat to the
person or property of an Indian or to specified tribal interests," 7
for example: (1) crimes calculated to obstruct the functioning of
tribal government (e.g., bribery of tribal officials); (2) consensual
crimes with Indian participants (e.g., statutory rape); or (3)
crimes under state law which, when adopted as federal law, in-
volve a direct threat to an identifiable Indian victim (e.g., reckless
endangerment, criminal trespass, riot or rout, disruption of a
public meeting or worship service conducted by the tribe).
The memo argues further that even where federal jurisdiction
over non-Indian victimless offenses properly lies, state courts retain
concurrent jurisdiction. To reach this conclusion, the Attorney
General relies primarily on the Williams v. Lee71 preemption
analysis. Accordingly, "in the absence of express federal legis-
lation, the authority of the states should be seen to be circum-
scribed only to the extent necessary to protect Indian interests in
making their own laws and being ruled by them." ' 7 There would
be such interference with tribal government if a state attempted
to prosecute an Indian defendant, but there is no such danger to
Indian interests if state as well as federal prosecutions of non-
Indians could be sustained.74 Federal jurisdiction would remain
to protect the Indian tribes if a state prosecution was not under-
taken or was prosecuted in bad faith."
The memorandum of the Justice Department should not be re-
garded as definitive authority as to whether states may prosecute
68. Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 66, at K-18.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at K-18 to K-20.
72. Id. at K-19, citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at K-19 to K-20.
19791
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
non.-Indians for victimless crimes committed on the reservation.
Given the adversary context that gave rise to the memorandum, it
should be taken cum grano salis. In its memorandum the Justice
Department was, in effect, telling the Mescalero Apache Tribe to
look to the states first for protection against non-Indian crime
and to the federal government only when the state protection had
proven ineffectual. The argument seems inconsistent with the
federal government's special trust responsibility to the tribes. In-
terestingly, a Solicitor's Opinion" reaches a conclusion opposite
to that of the Attorney General with respect to state jurisdiction
over non-Indian victimless offenses on the reservation. The
Solicitor saw the General Crimes Act as an expression of congres-
sional intent to preempt state court jurisdiction of victimless of-
fenses even where the non-Indian conduct threatened what the
Justice Department's memorandum would arguably label a "gen-
eralized interest" in reservation peace and tranquility." The
Solicitor stated that the policy of the General Crimes Act was
clearly to give to the tribes the protection of the United States in
return for which the tribes had given up their sovereignty78 with
the result that federal, and not state, jurisdiction is appropriate.
Although the final word has not been spoken on state jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian victimless crimes on the reservation, state
courts are likely to continue to uphold such jurisdiction until the
Supreme Court says otherwise, especially where tribes and states
are mutually desirous of such a jurisdictional arrangement.
3. Inherent Tribal Powers to Exclude Non-Indian
Trespassers from the Reservation
Although the United States Supreme Court in Oliphant held
that Indian tribal courts do not have any criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians absent an affirmative delegation of such power
by Congress, that decision did not deprive the tribes of any power
they possessed to detain-as opposed to arrest for purposes of
prosecuting in tribal courts-non-Indian offenders. In fact, the
Court in reaching its conclusion expressly relied on treaty pro-
visions that prescribed the tribes should turn over non-Indian of-
76. Dep't of Interior Solicitor's Opinion, Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by
Non-Indians Against Indians in Indian Country, Apr. 10, 1978, reprinted in 5 INDIAN L.
Rprm. H-10 (1978).
77. Examples are drunkenness in a tribal building or during a tribal function, or
reckless driving near an Indian school or in an Indian community. Id. at H-12.
78. Id.
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fenders to federal authorities for prosecution." These provisions
strongly imply a tribal right to detain or arrest and remit to
federal authorities violators of federal law.
It has been held that Indian tribes possess an inherent sover-
eignty except where it has been specifically taken away from them
by treaty or act of Congress.8" Intrinsic in that sovereignty is the
power of a tribe to create and administer a criminal justice system
and the power to exclude non-Indian trespassers who have
violated state or federal law by delivering the offenders to the ap-
propriate authorities. The leading case in this area is Ortiz-
Barraza v. United States.81
The Ortiz case involved the detention and frisk of the person of
a non-Indian and the search of his vehicle by a tribal police of-
ficer. The officer drove a distinctly marked patrol car with a red
light on top and was not deputized by state or federal authorities
to enforce state or federal laws. Noticing a suspicious-looking
pickup truck parked on a public highway within the boundaries
of the Papago Indian Reservation, the officer approached the
driver and asked to see the latter's operator's license and vehicle
registration. The driver stated in Spanish that he spoke no Eng-
lish. The tribal officer then frisked the defendant for identifica-
tion; finding none, he then searched the cab of the truck. When
he found no identifying papers in the pickup cab, the officer be-
lieved he was dealing with an alien who had illegally entered the
country and who could be transporting either controlled sub-
stances or illegal aliens over the United States-Mexican border.
Therefore, the tribal officer searched the camper, where he found
burlap sacks containing marijuana. The officer then took the
defendant to the reservation detention facility where he was held
until federal authorities took custody of him.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction for viola-
tion of federal drug laws despite the defendant's contention that
the tribal officer had acted in excess of his authority by conduct-
ing the search as part of an investigation of suspected state and
79. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
80. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
81. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). There is
nothing in Oliphant to suggest that the limited jurisdiction of tribal and Bureau of Indian
Affairs police, i.e., to arrest non-Indians and turn them over to the proper authorities,
has been removed. A recent Solicitor's Opinion, issued after Oliphant, reaffirms the right
of tribal police to arrest non-Indian offenders and deliver them to federal authorities. See
note 76 supra.
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federal law violations. The court found that the tribal officer had
the authority to investigate on-reservation violations of state and
federal law whenever the exclusion of the non-Indian offender
from the reservation may be contemplated, noting that the power
to exclude non-Indians from the reservation would be meaning-
less if the tribal police were not empowered to investigate such
violations.2 Expulsion from the reservation, as the term was used
in the court's opinion, included the detention of the non-Indian
offender and his remittance to appropriate non-Indian author-
ities.
Accordingly, it seems clear that tribal police officers may stop
non-Indian traffic offenders on the reservation and detain them
until appropriate non-Indian law enforcement officers appear on
the scene. The power to investigate crimes, with which a tribal of-
ficer is inherently authorized to conduct, logically includes, in the
context of traffic offenses, for example, the power to stop a vehi-
cle of a suspected offender. 3
4. Traditional Cross-Deputization
Pursuant to cross-deputization agreements between tribes and
states, tribal peace officers enforce the laws of the states against
persons or property subject to state jurisdiction, and state of-
ficers enforce laws of the tribes against persons or property sub-
ject to tribal jurisdiction. In such instances the state or tribal of-
ficer is acting as an officer of the government whose law is being en-
forced.
While offering some potential as a solution to the enforcement
problems after Oliphant, cross-deputization is of only limited
usefulness. First, it has become less frequent in recent years
because of increased friction between tribal and state of-
ficials-friction that may be associated with the quest of Indian
tribes for greater autonomy and rights of self-government. Whe-
ther the Oliphant decision will be conducive to greater cooper-
ation between state and tribal authorities remains to be seen. Sec-
ond, and more fundamental, the effectiveness of cross-
deputization as a solution to Oliphant-type enforcement problems
82. Id. at 1180.
83. The fact that a state offense occurs within the right of way of a state highway in
no way affects the authority of a tribal officer to act. Rights-of-way running through a
reservation are, by statutory definition, part of the reservation and are within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the tribal police. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970); Gourneau v. Smith,
207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
[Vol. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/4
NOTES
depends largely on judicial recognition of state jurisdiction over
non-Indian victimless offenses in Indian country-a question not
yet finally resolved. Should it be determined that no such juris-
diction exists, cross-deputized tribal officers will be powerless to
enforce state law on the reservation because state law would not
extend there. If courts opt in favor of state jurisdiction over non-
Indian victimless offenses, then cross-deputization can become a
viable response to the enforcement hiatus left by the Oliphant
decision.
However the victimless crime jurisdictional question is resolved,
cross-deputization agreements assume that the judicial or admin-
istrative body which ultimately orders enforcement of the law is
an arm of the same governmental body (tribe or state) whose law
is being enforced. A more useful, comprehensive, and flexible ap-
proach to solving jurisdictional and enforcement problems would
lie in tribal-state agreements whereby a tribe authorized a state to
apply in state tribunals either the laws of the tribe or the state to
persons subject to tribal jurisdiction within the reservations. Con-
versely, a state could authorize a tribe to enforce in its tribunals
state laws against persons or property within an Indian reserva-
tion who or which are subject to state jurisdiction.
The next section deals with proposed congressional enabling
legislation that would allow states and tribes to enter into just
such flexible jurisdictional and enforcement agreements on a
local level.
The Tribal-State Compact Act of 1979
Senate Bill 1811, the Tribal-State Compact Act of 1979, is pro-
posed congressional legislation that, if enacted, would give state
and tribal governments authority to enter into cooperative inter-
governmental agreements or compacts which may call for the ap-
plication or enforcement of each other's laws. The bill, if it
becomes law, would provide a framework for solving many of the
jurisdictional and enforcement difficulties posed by Oliphant. It
would also resolve a broad range of jurisdictional disputes be-
tween the states and the tribes in both the civil and criminal law
areas. However, the bill does not purport by its own power to
vest in Indian tribes the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.8 ' Neither does it generally alter the current
84. S. RP. 1178, Tribal-State Compact Act of 1978, to accompany S. 2502, at 7,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 1178].
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jurisdictional allocation in Indian country by federal, state, and
tribal governments by its own force." It does, however, empower
tribes and states cojointly to alter that general jurisdictional pat-
tern in particular instances. It does so by allowing the tribes and
the states and their political subdivisions to enter into compacts
or agreements that provide for the application of the civil, crim-
inal, or regulatory laws of either entity over Indians or non-
Indians, as they see fit.16 S. 1181 is intended to provide a flexible
vehicle to enable the parties most directly affected by jurisdic-
tional allocations to tailor comprehensive solutions whenever jur-
isdictional questions are the subject of a tribal-state agreement. "
The bill is intended to authorize tribes to enter into agreements
with the states that will authorize the state to enforce state or
tribal laws over Indians in those cases where the tribe has the un-
derlying authority.8 It is also the intent of the bill to authorize
states to enter into agreements with Indian tribes for the enforce-
merit of state or tribal laws against non-Indians within Indian
country in tribal courts in those cases where the state has the
underlying authority. 9 To that extent the bill modifies the
holding of Oliphant."0
Before its current consideration as S. 1181 by the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs in the first session of the Ninety-
sixth Congress, the Tribal State Compact Act was introduced and
considered in the second session of the Ninety-fifth Congress as
S. 2502. On September 7, 1978, it was reported to the full Senate.
On October 6, 1978, the Senate passed an amended version which
was referred to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs. In the House the original bill had been introduced as H. R.
11489, but neither the original bill nor the Senate's amended ver-
sion was acted upon by the House before the close of the Ninety-
fifth Congress.
The bill represents a priority recommendation contained in the
Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission,
that, "States and county governments sit down with the tribal
governments and to the extent possible resolve their jurisdictional
conflicts to their mutual satisfaction on the basis of mutual
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id.
9D. Id.
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respect." 91 The keynote of the Commission's recommendation is
thus cooperation. The Commission rejected as not feasible any
"attempt to legislatively determine the precise powers of each of
[the some 287 tribal governments in the United States] in one
legislative enactment." 92 Similarly, it rejected the notion that
"the jurisdiction of the tribes should be limited to their member-
ship alone. If such a position were adopted it could truly be said
that the tribes were mere social clubs, an assembly of property
owners, with no more authority than any civic association." 93
Only to the extent that resolution between the state and its polit-
ical subdivision (e.g., county and municipal governments), on the
one hand, and tribal government, on the other, cannot be achieved
on a cooperative basis, did the Commission recommend legisla-
tive action by Congress to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. 9
The legislative purpose underlying S. 1181 is to facilitate these
recommendations of the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission. In seeking to implement these recommendations, the
staff of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs found
that despite considerable interest on the part of state and county
organizations to discuss jurisdictional issues with the tribes, there
are existing legal impediments preventing agreements relating to
jurisdictional issues. 95 Accordingly, the bill has two main aims:
(1) to allow states and tribes to solve local problems on a local
level by providing affirmative congressional approval for them to
enter into flexible jurisdictional and enforcement agreements on
the basis of mutual assent; 96 and (2) to remove the existing legal
obstacles to such agreements presented by the formal prerequi-
sites of Public Law 83-280 to the transfer of jurisdiction from the
tribe to the state. 97 Express congressional approval is always re-
quired for state courts to assume jurisdiction in Indian country.
At present, Public Law 83-280 is the only statute of general appli-
cability that specifically addresses the allocation of jurisdiction
between the tribes and the states. 9 There are substantial legal
91. 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See STAFF OF SENATE SELECr COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, STAFF BACKGROUND
MEMORANDUM ON S. 2502 (Comm. Print 1978) as reprinted in Hearing on S. 2502, supra
note 11, at 13 [hereinafter cited as STAFF MEMO].
96. Compare generally STAFF MEMO, supra note 95.
97. Id. at 13-15.
98. As amended by Title IV of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-25. See also text at note 17.
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questions associated with that statute, however, such as the right
of the tribe to rescind a jurisdictional grant to a state and to
reassume jurisdiction itself; whether a tribal grant of jurisdiction
to the state need necessarily be exclusive, thus precluding the
possibility of concurrent tribal-state jurisdiction; whether the
statute permits piecemeal subject matter or geographic jurisdic-
tion, or whether such assumption of jurisdiction by the state must
be all-inclusive; and whether a state can assume any jurisdiction
over an Indian in Indian country without first amending the state
constitution.
As originally enacted, Public Law 83-280 did not require that
jurisdictional allocations between the tribes and the states rest on
the mutual consent of the two parties. Public Law 83-280 was
amended in 1968, however, to require tribal consent before a
state could assume jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country.
Provision was also made for the states to retrocede jurisdiction to
the federal government, if they desired to do so, but no similar
privilege was granted to the tribes. S. 1181 does not purport to
amend Public Law 83-280 to allow tribal 'retrocession. It does,
however, avoid the pitfalls of that legislation by specifically pro-
viding for cancellation of agreement by either party." It avoids
the inflexibility of Public Law 83-280 by authorizing the broadest
latitude to tribal and state governments to enter into government
agreements rather than formal cessions of jurisdiction with a
resultant permanent loss of control. 00
The heart of the legal impediment to intergovernmental agree-
ments posed by Public Law 83-280 lies in two key legal tests that
are employed to determine whether state action in Indian country
can be sustained.' °' The first test, formulated in Williams v.
Lee,11 2 is whether the action infringes on the right of the Indian
tribes to be self-governing. In 1971, in Kennerly v. District
Court,'0 3 the Supreme Court, elaborating on the Williams test,
said the true test was "federal preemption." Thus, in absence of
compliance by both the state and the tribe with some federal
enabling statute, in this case Public Law 83-280, the jurisdiction
of a state over an Indian in Indian country could not be sustained.
Therefore, it was held in Kennerly that a state could not exercise
99. STAFF MEMO, supra note 95.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 13-15; S. REp. 1178, supra note 84, at 6-7.
102. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
103. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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civil jurisdiction over a purchase and sale agreement between an
Indian and a non-Indian on the Blackfeet Reservation, even
though a tribal ordinance authorized state jurisdiction over civil
matters within the reservation.
While the infringement and the preemption tests provide sub-
stantial protection to tribal governments, the preemption test in
particular may on occasion thwart the effort of tribes to work
with states on a cooperative basis. In Blackwolf v. District
Court,104 it was held that the state of Montana could not exercise
jurisdiction over an Indian juvenile for conduct within a reserva-
tion, even though the child had been adjudicated'a delinquent in
tribal court and remanded to state authorities for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with a tribal ordinance that provided for
such a procedure. In White v. Califano,05 it was held that a state
could not exercise jurisdiction to order an involuntary commit-
ment of a mentally ill Indian residing within a reservation, even
though the tribal court had adjudicated her to be mentally ill and
had ordered her committed to the State Human Services Center.
In these two instances, the interests of tribal government clearly
would have been furthered by allowing tribes to arrange with the
states for the enforcement of tribal law or the application of state
law to their own tribal members in selected circumstances.10 6
Although Oliphant held that Indian tribes cannot exercise any
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes may clearly
exercise derivative authority over non-Indians under appropriate
federal legislation.107 The promise that S. 1181 holds as a means
of coming to terms with the enforcement and jurisdictional
vacuum left by Oliphant becomes apparent from a consideration
of the bill's provisions relating to the extent and variety of
agreements it would authorize. Section 101(a) of the bill extends
the authority of the United States to tribes, states, and political
subdivisions to enter into agreements providing for (1) the en-
forcement or application of civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of
each within their respective jurisdiction; (2) the allocation or
determination of governmental responsibility of states and tribes
over specified matters or specified geographical areas, or both,
including agreements or compacts which provide for concurrent
jurisdiction; and (3) agreements or compacts which provide for
104. 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972).
105. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
106. See S. REP. 1178, supra note 84, at 7.
107. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
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the transfer of jurisdiction of individual cases from tribal to state
court, or vice versa, pursuant to established legal procedures.
Thus, S. 1181 would authorize agreements between tribes and
states according to which non-Indian offenders may be arrested
by tribal police for violations of either tribal or state law and may
be prosecuted in tribal court for the violation of either tribal or
state law, as the parties may agree. Such a tribal-state agreement
could authorize a transfer of a case against a non-Indian from
tribal to state court, which would then be obligated to prosecute
the defendant according to either state or tribal law, depending
on the terms of the agreement.
Conversely, a tribe might transfer territorial jurisdiction over
some or all roads and highways within a reservation, partial or
total subject-matter jurisdiction over traffic offenses, or personal
jurisdiction over tribal members to a state possessing both the
facilities and the desire to assume the responsibility for making
reservation roadways safe. The agreement might provide for the
state to enforce its laws uniformly against Indians and non-
Indians alike (assuming for the moment that states have criminal
jurisdiction over victimless offenses such as traffic violations), or
to enforce only tribal law against both tribal or nontribal
members.
An agreement calling for the state to enforce tribal law against
tribal members and state law against non-Indians would also be
possible. Similarly, it could be provided that tribal members be
brought before tribal court and non-Indians before state courts if
the parties so desired. Myriad permutations and computations of
personal, subject matter, and territorial jurisdiction transfers
from the one government entity to the other would be possible.
The parties are free to tailor an agreement to cover unique local
enforcement and jurisdictional problems not shared by other
tribes and other states. Flexibility, nonuniformity, and decentral-
ization are the hallmarks of S. 1181. The bill certainly marks a
shift in emphasis of federal Indian policy away from solving
Indian-related problems on a national level toward solving them
on a local level. Insofar as it does not require approval of tribal-
state agreements by the Secretary of the Interior,' 6 S. 1181
108. Originally S. 2502 made all tribal-state agreements subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. During the hearings on S. 2502, representatives criticized the
secretarial approval requirement as an unwarranted extension of the power of the
Secretary. See Hearing on S. 2502, supra note 11, at 32 (comments of Sam Deloria, Direc-
tor of the American Indian Law Center), into an area in which the trust responsibility has
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recognizes the competency of today's tribes to negotiate as equals
with state government. 09
S. 1181 is by no means a panacea to the jurisdictional void
wrought by the Oliphant decision. It authorizes tribal-state
jurisdictional transfers only where either the state or the tribe
clearly has jurisdiction over the subject matter, persons, or terri-
tory in question. It does not authorize any derogation from ex-
isting federal jurisdiction. The most pressing enforcement and
jurisdictional problems in the post-Oliphant era are to be found
in the area of victimless crimes. Yet the extent of federal jurisdic-
tion under the General Crimes Act and the extent of state juris-
diction under the McBratney doctrine over victimless non-Indian
offenses is not clear. To the extent that the states are found to
have such jurisdiction, tribal-state compacts of the sort author-
ized by S. 1181 can provide a means of clearly defining the roles
of tribal and state policies in enforcement and of tribal and state
courts in prosecution of offenses committed by non-Indians in
Indian country.
Conclusion
Any effective solution to the enforcement problems that
resulted from the Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant that In-
dian tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians necessarily depends on the cooperation and good faith of
the three government entities among which jurisdiction in Indian
country is divided.
If, pursuant to its special trust responsibilities toward the In-
dian tribes, the federal government is looked to as the source of a
solution, a fundamental change in the philosophy, procedure,
and training of federal law enforcement officers and prosecuting
officials would seem necessary. Regulations could be issued by
the Justice Department to obligate United States Attorneys' of-
fices to accept criminal referrals from qualified tribal police or
not traditionally been regarded as authorizing an intrusion into tribal affairs. See Hear-
ing, supra, at 67 (comments of Alex La Forge, Chairman, Law and Order Commission,
Crow Tribal Council, Montana). The secretarial approval requirement has now been
deleted. S. 1181 requires in Section 101(c) simply that tribal-state compacts be filed with
the Secretary within thirty days of consummation.
109. In the hearings on S. 2502, the opinion was expressed that the legislation would
put the tribes on an equal footing with the states. Only when that is done can true
dialogue begin. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2502, supra note 11, at 74 (statement of Alex La
Forge).
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BIA. investigators. Tribal police could be federalized, i.e., em-
powered to enforce federal law (either state or tribal law adopted
as federal law through the Assimilative Crimes Act) against non-
Indian offenders. At any rate, federal law enforcement personnel
of some kind should be placed on the reservations, and each
United States Attorney's office in whose district an Indian tribe is
located should assign at least one prosecutor to specialize more or
less exclusively in Indian-related matters.
Tribes can attempt to protect their interests by making max-
imum use of their inherent power to exclude non-Indian of-
fenders from the reservation by detaining them until the ap-
propriate federal or state law enforcement authorities arrive to ar-
rest the offender. Tribal action of this sort can, however, only
become an effective remedy to the enforcement problems posed
by Oliphant if federal or state authorities are willing to cooperate
by taking custody of non-Indian offenders detained by tribal au-
thorities and vigorously prosecuting. Similarly, cross-deputization
depends on state-tribal cooperation if it is to be effective in com-
batting non-Indian crime on the reservations because cross-
deputization agreements will not materialize if a cooperative at-
titude does not exist between state and tribal authorities.
Cooperation and good faith between government entities with
jurisdictional responsibilities in Indian country is the premise
upon which the enforcement and jurisdictional agreements au-
thorized by S. 1181 are based. Perhaps, if S. 1181 becomes law,
the tribes and the states will realize that practical solutions to
mutually aggravating problems are possible only if they set aside
their jurisdictional jealousies and together seek a mutually sat-
isfactory solution.110 The mere enactment of S. 1181 into law
would be a clear signal to the states and the tribes that inter-
governmental cooperation had become federal policy and that no
general federal solution to jurisdictional disputes would be forth-
coming. As such, the bill would, by its simple enactment, con-
stitute a powerful inducement for tribes and states to sit down,
110. It was frequently stated in the hearings on S. 2502 that in the past discussions of
the intergovernmental relationship issues between tribes and states have been preoccupied
with those jurisdictional issues that divide the two governments. There was very little
discussion on the many areas where the two governments can cooperate with each other.
See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2502, supra note 11, at 31 (comments of Sam Deloria). The
legislalion was often viewed as initiating a process whereby tribes and states could first
enter into agreements on "easy questions" and then in time would negotiate agreements
on more significant and complex jurisdictional issues once they have established a
cooperative relationship with each other. Id. at 32.
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hammer out differences, and fashion agreements that represent a
particularized response to their own unique local problems. The
enactment of S. 1181 would leave a way open for tribal-state
agreements on hot pursuit, child support, child placement, ex-
tradition" 1 and rendition, arrest and detention procedures, fish
and game zoning violations, speed limits, and collection and shar-
ing of tax revenues, to name only a few areas.
In order for S. 1181 to become an effective means toward solv-
ing the most troublesome enforcement problem left by Oliphant,
however, states must be judicially recognized as having victimless
crime jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reservations.
Without the resolution of whether the state or the federal govern-
ment or both have jurisdiction in that area, any attempted en-
forcement solutions to an Oliphant kind of problem will be marred
by uncertainty. Should the courts ultimately decide that the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, only an increased
federal presence on the reservations or congressional delegation
of authority to the tribes to prosecute non-Indians will adequately
fill the jurisdictional and enforcement void left behind as the
legacy of Oliphant. If states are recognized as having jurisdiction
exclusive of or concurrent with the federal government, then S.
1181 is the most promising vehicle for an effective solution,
allowing, as it does, a specific, localized resolution in contrast to
a general, national remedy to the threat imposed by non-Indian
victimless offenses on the reservation.
111. Extradition is a subject area that has caused some controversy in Montana in the
past. In State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970), it was held that where the tribal government had provided for extradi-
tion procedures, a state had no power to extradite an Indian from the reservation accord-
ing to state law since that would impermissibly infringe upon tribal government in contra-
vention of the Williams v. Lee test, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). The Montana Supreme
Court has narrowly interpreted and applied the holding of Merrill. In State ex rel. Old
Elk v. District Ct., 170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, 1398 (1976), the Montana court held
that in the absence of tribal law and federal regulations pertaining to extradition of a
reservation Indian, an arrest could be made on the reservation by a state officer pursuant
to a state arrest warrant despite the refusal of a tribal judge to issue a tribal court order
for the arrest of the person sought. The Crow Tribe subsequently adopted a tribal or-
dinance governing extradition procedures. See Rule 26, Law and Order Code of the Crow
Tribe.
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